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Windows NT/2000下不用驱动的Ring0代码实现
Windows NT/2000下不用驱动的Ring0代码实现 
            WebCrazy(http://webcrazy.yeah.net/) 
  
    大家知道,Windows NT/2000为实现其可靠性,严格将系统划分为内核模式与用户模 
式,在i386系统中分别对应CPU的Ring0与Ring3级别。Ring0下,可以执行特权级指令, 
对任何I/O设备都有访问权等等。要实现从用户态进入核心态,即从Ring 3进入Ring 0必 
须借助CPU的某种门机制,如中断门、调用门等。而Windows NT/2000提供用户态执行系 
统服务(Ring 0例程)的此类机制即System Service的int 2eh中断服务等,严格的参数检 
查,只能严格的执行Windows NT/2000提供的服务,而如果想执行用户提供的Ring 0代码 
(指运行在Ring 0权限的代码),常规方法似乎只有编写设备驱动程序。本文将介绍一种 
在用户态不借助任何驱动程序执行Ring0代码的方法。 
    Windows NT/2000将设备驱动程序调入内核区域(常见的位于地址0x80000000上),由 
DPL为0的GDT项8,即cs为8时实现Ring 0权限。本文通过在系统中构造一个指向我们的代 
码的调用门(CallGate),实现Ring0代码。基于这个思路,为实现这个目的主要是构造自 
己的CallGate。CallGate由系统中叫Global Descriptor Table(GDT)的全局表指定。GD 
T地址可由i386指令sgdt获得(sgdt不是特权级指令,普通Ring 3程序均可执行)。GDT地 
址在Windows NT/2000保存于KPCR(Processor Control Region)结构中(见《再谈Window 
s NT/2000环境切换》)。GDT中的CallGate是如下的格式: 
    typedef struct 
    { 
        unsigned short  offset_0_15; 
        unsigned short  selector; 
        unsigned char    param_count : 4; 
        unsigned char    some_bits   : 4; 
        unsigned char    type        : 4; 
        unsigned char    app_system  : 1; 
        unsigned char    dpl         : 2; 
        unsigned char    present     : 1; 
        unsigned short  offset_16_31; 
    } CALLGATE_DESCRIPTOR; 
    GDT位于内核区域,一般用户态的程序是不可能对这段内存区域有直接的访问权。幸 
运的是Windows NT/2000提供了一个叫PhysicalMemory的Section内核对象位于\Device的 
路径下。顾名思义,通过这个Section对象可以对物理内存进行操作。用objdir.exe对这 
个对象分析如下: 
    C:\NTDDK\bin>objdir /D \Device 
    PhysicalMemory 
        Section 
        DACL - 
           Ace[ 0] - Grant - 0xf001f - NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
                             Inherit: 
                             Access: 0x001F  and  ( D RCtl WOwn WDacl ) 
           Ace[ 1] - Grant - 0x2000d - BUILTIN\Administrators 
                             Inherit: 
                             Access: 0x000D  and  ( RCtl ) 
    从dump出的这个对象DACL的Ace可以看出默认情况下只有SYSTEM用户才有对这个对象 
的读写权限,即对物理内存有读写能力,而Administrator只有读权限,普通用户根本就 
没有权限。不过如果我们有Administrator权限就可以通过GetSecurityInfo、SetEntri 
esInAcl与SetSecurityInfo这些API来修改这个对象的ACE。这也是我提供的代码需要Ad 
ministrator的原因。实现的代码如下: 
    VOID SetPhyscialMemorySectionCanBeWrited(HANDLE hSection) 
    { 
       PACL pDacl=NULL; 
       PACL pNewDacl=NULL; 
       PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSD=NULL; 
       DWORD dwRes; 
       EXPLICIT_ACCESS ea; 
       if(dwRes=GetSecurityInfo(hSection,SE_KERNEL_OBJECT,DACL_SECURITY_INFO 
RMATION, 
                  NULL,NULL,&pDacl,NULL,&pSD)!=ERROR_SUCCESS) 
          { 
             printf( "GetSecurityInfo Error %u\n", dwRes ); 
             goto CleanUp; 
          } 
       ZeroMemory(&ea, sizeof(EXPLICIT_ACCESS)); 
       ea.grfAccessPermissions = SECTION_MAP_WRITE; 
       ea.grfAccessMode = GRANT_ACCESS; 
       ea.grfInheritance= NO_INHERITANCE; 
       ea.Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_NAME; 
       ea.Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_USER; 
       ea.Trustee.ptstrName = "CURRENT_USER"; 
       if(dwRes=SetEntriesInAcl(1,&ea,pDacl,&pNewDacl)!=ERROR_SUCCESS) 
          { 
             printf( "SetEntriesInAcl %u\n", dwRes ); 
             goto CleanUp; 
          } 
       if(dwRes=SetSecurityInfo(hSection,SE_KERNEL_OBJECT,DACL_SECURITY_INFO 
RMATION,NULL,NULL,pNewDacl,NULL)!=ERROR_SUCCESS) 
          { 
             printf("SetSecurityInfo %u\n",dwRes); 
             goto CleanUp; 
          } 
    CleanUp: 
       if(pSD) 
          LocalFree(pSD); 
       if(pNewDacl) 
          LocalFree(pSD); 
    } 
    这段代码对给定HANDLE的对象增加了如下的ACE: 
    PhysicalMemory 
        Section 
        DACL - 
           Ace[ 0] - Grant - 0x2 - WEBCRAZY\Administrator 
                             Inherit: 
                             Access: 0x0002    //SECTION_MAP_WRITE 
    这样我们在有Administrator权限的条件下就有了对物理内存的读写能力。但若要修 
改GDT表实现Ring 0代码。我们将面临着另一个难题,因为sgdt指令获得的GDT地址是虚 
拟地址(线性地址),我们只有知道GDT表的物理地址后才能通过\Device\PhysicalMemor 
y对象修改GDT表,这就牵涉到了线性地址转化成物理地址的问题。我们先来看一看Wind 
ows NT/2000是如何实现这个的: 
    kd> u nt!MmGetPhysicalAddress l 30 
    ntoskrnl!MmGetPhysicalAddress: 
    801374e0 56               push    esi 
    801374e1 8b742408         mov     esi,[esp+0x8] 
    801374e5 33d2             xor     edx,edx 
    801374e7 81fe00000080     cmp     esi,0x80000000 
    801374ed 722c             jb    ntoskrnl!MmGetPhysicalAddress+0x2b (8013 
751b) 
    801374ef 81fe000000a0     cmp     esi,0xa0000000 
    801374f5 7324             jnb   ntoskrnl!MmGetPhysicalAddress+0x2b (8013 
751b) 
    801374f7 39153ce71780     cmp     [ntoskrnl!MmKseg2Frame (8017e73c)],edx 
  
    801374fd 741c             jz    ntoskrnl!MmGetPhysicalAddress+0x2b (8013 
751b) 
    801374ff 8bc6             mov     eax,esi 
    80137501 c1e80c           shr     eax,0xc 
    80137504 25ffff0100       and     eax,0x1ffff 
    80137509 6a0c             push    0xc 
    8013750b 59               pop     ecx 
    8013750c e8d3a7fcff       call    ntoskrnl!_allshl (80101ce4) 
    80137511 81e6ff0f0000     and     esi,0xfff 
    80137517 03c6             add     eax,esi 
    80137519 eb17             jmp   ntoskrnl!MmGetPhysicalAddress+0x57 (8013 
7532) 
    8013751b 8bc6             mov     eax,esi 
    8013751d c1e80a           shr     eax,0xa 
    80137520 25fcff3f00       and     eax,0x3ffffc 
    80137525 2d00000040       sub     eax,0x40000000 
    8013752a 8b00             mov     eax,[eax] 
    8013752c a801             test    al,0x1 
    8013752e 7506             jnz   ntoskrnl!MmGetPhysicalAddress+0x44 (8013 
7536) 
    80137530 33c0             xor     eax,eax 
    80137532 5e               pop     esi 
    80137533 c20400           ret     0x4 
    从这段汇编代码可看出如果线性地址在0x80000000与0xa0000000范围内,只是简单 
的进行移位操作(位于801374ff-80137519指令间),并未查页表。我想Microsoft这样安 
排肯定是出于执行效率的考虑。这也为我们指明了一线曙光,因为GDT表在Windows NT/ 
2000中一般情况下均位于这个区域(我不知道/3GB开关的Windows NT/2000是不是这种情 
况)。 
    经过这样的分析,我们就可以只通过用户态程序修改GDT表了。而增加一个CallGat 
e就不是我可以介绍的了,找本Intel手册自己看一看了。具体实现代码如下: 
    typedef struct gdtr { 
        short Limit; 
        short BaseLow; 
        short BaseHigh; 
    } Gdtr_t, *PGdtr_t; 
    ULONG MiniMmGetPhysicalAddress(ULONG virtualaddress) 
    { 
        if(virtualaddress<0x80000000||virtualaddress>=0xA0000000) 
           return 0; 
        return virtualaddress&0x1FFFF000; 
    } 
    BOOL ExecRing0Proc(ULONG Entry,ULONG seglen) 
    { 
       Gdtr_t gdt; 
       __asm sgdt gdt; 
       ULONG mapAddr=MiniMmGetPhysicalAddress(gdt.BaseHigh<<16U|gdt.BaseLow) 
; 
       if(!mapAddr) return 0; 
       HANDLE   hSection=NULL; 
       NTSTATUS status; 
       OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES        objectAttributes; 
       UNICODE_STRING objName; 
       CALLGATE_DESCRIPTOR *cg; 
       status = STATUS_SUCCESS; 
       RtlInitUnicodeString(&objName,L"\\Device\\PhysicalMemory"); 
       InitializeObjectAttributes(&objectAttributes, 
                                  &objName, 
                                  OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, 
                                  NULL, 
                                 (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) NULL); 
       status = ZwOpenSection(&hSection,SECTION_MAP_READ|SECTION_MAP_WRITE,& 
objectAttributes); 
       if(status == STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED){ 
          status = ZwOpenSection(&hSection,READ_CONTROL|WRITE_DAC,&objectAtt 
ributes); 
          SetPhyscialMemorySectionCanBeWrited(hSection); 
          ZwClose(hSection); 
          status =ZwOpenSection(&hSection,SECTION_MAP_WRITE|SECTION_MAP_WRIT 
E,&objectAttributes); 
       } 
       if(status != STATUS_SUCCESS) 
         { 
            printf("Error Open PhysicalMemory Section Object,Status:%08X\n", 
status); 
            return 0; 
         } 
       PVOID BaseAddress; 
       BaseAddress=MapViewOfFile(hSection, 
                     FILE_MAP_READ|FILE_MAP_WRITE, 
                     0, 
                     mapAddr,    //low part 
                     (gdt.Limit+1)); 
       if(!BaseAddress) 
          { 
             printf("Error MapViewOfFile:"); 
             PrintWin32Error(GetLastError()); 
             return 0; 
          } 
       BOOL setcg=FALSE; 
       for(cg=(CALLGATE_DESCRIPTOR *)((ULONG)BaseAddress+(gdt.Limit&0xFFF8)) 
;(ULONG)cg>(ULONG)BaseAddress;cg--) 
           if(cg->type == 0){ 
             cg->offset_0_15 = LOWORD(Entry); 
             cg->selector = 8; 
             cg->param_count = 0; 
             cg->some_bits = 0; 
             cg->type = 0xC;          // 386 call gate 
             cg->app_system = 0;      // A system descriptor 
             cg->dpl = 3;             // Ring 3 code can call 
             cg->present = 1; 
             cg->offset_16_31 = HIWORD(Entry); 
             setcg=TRUE; 
             break; 
          } 
       if(!setcg){ 
            ZwClose(hSection); 
            return 0; 
       } 
       short farcall[3]; 
       farcall[2]=((short)((ULONG)cg-(ULONG)BaseAddress))|3;  //Ring 3 callg 
ate; 
       if(!VirtualLock((PVOID)Entry,seglen)) 
          { 
             printf("Error VirtualLock:"); 
             PrintWin32Error(GetLastError()); 
             return 0; 
          } 
       SetThreadPriority(GetCurrentThread(),THREAD_PRIORITY_TIME_CRITICAL); 
       Sleep(0); 
       _asm call fword ptr [farcall] 
       SetThreadPriority(GetCurrentThread(),THREAD_PRIORITY_NORMAL); 
       VirtualUnlock((PVOID)Entry,seglen); 
       //Clear callgate 
       *(ULONG *)cg=0; 
       *((ULONG *)cg+1)=0; 
       ZwClose(hSection); 

       return TRUE; 
    } 
    我在提供的代码中演示了对Control Register与I/O端口的操作。CIH病毒在Window 
s 9X中就是因为获得Ring 0权限才有了一定的危害,但Windows NT/2000毕竟不是Windo 
ws 9X,她已经有了比较多的安全审核机制,本文提供的代码也要求具有Administrator 
权限,但如果系统存在某种漏洞,如缓冲区溢出等等,还是有可能获得这种权限的,所 
以我不对本文提供的方法负有任何的责任,所有讨论只是一个技术热爱者在讨论技术而 
已。谢谢! 
    参考资料: 
      1.Intel Corp< 
>